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I. INTRODUCTION
n Terry v. Ohio, Chief Justice Earl Warren stated that "[n]o judicial
opinion can comprehend the protean variety of the street encounter." 1
Contacts between police and citizens run the gamut from innocuous ex-
changes to full-blown custodial arrests. While a large percentage of po-
lice-citizen encounters may be classified readily as falling within the pro-
tections of the fourth amendment,2 a number of them are difficult to
categorize.3 Since the decision in Terry, the U.S. Supreme Court has been
grappling with the issue of when such encounters do, in fact, mandate
fourth amendment protection.4
The Court's most recent pronouncement in this area, Immigration and
Naturalization Service v. Delgado,5 involved an Immigration and Natu-
ralization Service (INS) factory sweep and the ensuing encounter between
immigration officials and plant employees. In this significant and contro-
versial opinion, the Court found that the Delgado encounter did not
*Associate Professor of Law, Pepperdine University.
392 U.S. 1 (1968).
This is especially true in a situation resembling a traditional arrest. See Dunaway v.
New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979)(petitioner taken into custody and subjected to
interrogation).
' Given the diversity of encounters between police officers and citizens, the Supreme
Court has been cautious in defining the limits imposed on these encounters by the fourth
amendment. INS v. Delgado, - U.S. __, 104 S. Ct. 1758, 1762 (1984).
See text accompanying notes 32-33.
- U.S. -, 104 S. Ct. 1758 (1984).
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amount to a seizure and, therefore, did not merit fourth amendment pro-
tection, despite uncontroverted facts tending to establish the opposite re-
sult under pre-Delgado law.'
The opinion of the Court suggests that Delgado is merely an applica-
tion of existing law to the factory survey scenario. However, the case may
be viewed as a significant departure from Terry7 and its progeny, one
that, in fact, creates a new standard for characterizing police-citizen en-
counters. This Article will review Terry and its aftermath vis-a-vis the
police-citizen "encounter." It will then discuss the impact of the decision
and the direction of the Court in the wake of Delgado.
II. BACKGROUND
An examination of the Supreme Court's position over the sixteen years
after the Terry decision provides some clarity as to the character of po-
lice-citizen encounters. The decisions rendered by the Court generally fall
into three categories, each describing a different type of encounter be-
tween state officials and citizens. The most easily identifiable and restric-
tive of these confrontations is the arrest, which unquestionably falls
within the fourth amendment prohibition against unreasonable seizures.
The second category, the detention or "stop," was first recognized in
Terry as less restrictive than an arrest, but nonetheless a seizure, thereby
invoking the protection of the fourth amendment.' The third and most
loosely defined category, encompassing all other encounters between citi-
zens and police that do not rise to the level of a seizure, falls outside of
the protection of the amendment.9
By extending the protection of the fourth amendment to non-arrest sit-
uations, the Terry court acknowledged the existence of a variety of situa-
tions that necessitate allowing police briefly to stop and detain an indi-
vidual for questioning.10 The Court, although distinguishing this stop or
detention from an arrest, clearly held that both types of encounters are
fourth amendment seizures."
Generally, the Court has acknowledged that the full panoply of en-
counters between police and citizens should not be embraced within the
limits imposed by the fourth amendment: "The fourth amendment does
6 Id. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 1759.
7 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
8 The rationale is that any seizure "is a serious intrusion upon the sanctity of the per-
son, which may inflict great indignity and arouse strong resentment, and it is not to be
taken lightly." Id. at 17.
9 This third category may well have developed through the Court's reluctance in Terry
itself to immunize vast segments of police conduct in street encounters from constitutional
challenge. See WHITEBREAD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 175-75 (3d ed. 1980).
W 392 U.S. at 20.
The Court rejected the notion that the fourth amendment does not come into play as
a limitation upon police conduct. Id. at 19.
[Vol. 33:323
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not proscribe all contact between the police and citizens, but is designed
to prevent arbitrary and oppressive interference by law enforcement offi-
cials with the privacy and personal security of individuals."'" Neverthe-
less, significant questions remain as to the parameters of those en-
counters characterized and protected as seizures, as opposed to mere
unprotected encounters."2
In the wake of Terry, the Supreme Court has rendered several deci-
sions providing some instruction for distinguishing one type of encounter
from another."' Prior to review of those decisions, however, it is necessary
to set forth the factual scenario of Delgado in order to give the subse-
quent discussion of that decision a concrete context for evaluation and
comparison.
III. I.N.S. v. Delgado
Delgado involved a specialized fact situation"5 that the Court found
was not a seizure and, therefore, fell outside of the protection of the
fourth amendment."' In Delgado, INS agents, acting pursuant to search
warrants, 7 conducted a "survey" of the work force at Southern California
Davis Pleating Company (Davis Pleating) to apprehend suspected illegal
aliens.' 8 The warrants had been issued upon a showing of probable
" - U.S. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 1762 (citing United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S.
543, 554 (1976)).
" See supra note 3.
See, e.g., Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1984); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S.
544 (1980); Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968).
" This was a request for injunctive relief to prohibit "factory surveys" or raids to dis-
cover illegal aliens.
- U.S. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 1759.
" The INS receives information, sometimes from anonymous sources, that a particular
factory may be employing illegal aliens. The INS then will either request consent from the
factory owner to enter and search for illegal aliens or obtain a search warrant if consent is
refused. GEO. U.L. CENTER IMM. L. REP. 29-30 (Fall 1983).
" Factory survey raids may not be the irreplaceable tool that the INS claims they are.
One study emphasized that "it is both more humane and cost effective to deter people from
entering the United States than it is to locate and remove them from the interior." U.S.
IMMIGRATION POLICY AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST: FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF
THE SELECT COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICY TO THE CONGRESS AND THE
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 47 (1981). A study done by the Commission estimated
that Border Patrol operations cost $43.38 per illegal alien apprehended as opposed to $73.55
per alien expelled as a result of INS operations in the interior. NORTH, ENFORCING THE IMMI-
GRATION LAW: A REVIEW OF THE OPTIONS 16-17 (1980). The study also indicates that the
"INS has traditionally allocated a relatively slight portion of its resources to interior en-
forcement." Id. at 53. The INS in its PRELIMINARY REPORT ON PROJECT JOBS (1983), sug-
gested that those raids opened up few jobs for documented workers while imposing signifi-
cant costs on taxpayers, workers and employees. The INS arrested 5,440 aliens in nine
metropolitan areas, and claimed the project was a success since "the jobs referred represent
$50.6 million in annual wages." Id. at 1. However, the raids cost more than $1 million in
direct INS expenditures as well as unestimated losses caused by workplace disruption. Brief
1984-851
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cause' 9 that numerous illegal aliens were employed at Davis Pleating, al-
though none were specifically named. The INS conducted two "surveys"
at Davis Pleating, one in January of 1977 and another in October of 1977.
A third survey was conducted at Mr. Pleat, another garment factory, with
the employer's consent.20 Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority,
found that the "survey" encounter between a government agent and a
private individual did not warrant the level of protection mandated by a
seizure."
The manner in which the INS conducted all three of these "surveys"
was essentially the same. Immediately upon the arrival of INS officials at
each site, several agents positioned themselves at the building's exists,
while other agents questioned employees at their work stations. The INS
agents were armed, carried walkie-talkies and displayed their badges.
They questioned most, but not all, of the employees. 22
The agents moved systematically throughout the factory; they ap-
proached employees, identified themselves, and then asked questions con-
cerning the employee's citizenship. If the employee gave a "satisfactory"
response, the agents moved on; if the employee gave an "unsatisfactory"
response or admitted that he was an alien, the employee was then asked
to produce his immigration papers. During the survey, all employees in-
cluding the four named respondents 3 continued with their work and were
of the Mexican American Legal Defense & Education Fund, Inc. and the American Jewish
Committee as Amicus Curiae at 21, INS v. Delgado, U.S. -, 104 S. Ct. 1758 (1984)
[hereinafter cited as Amicus Brief).
9 Probable cause for the search warrant was based on depositions and affidavits of INS
agents, who conceded that they reached the conclusion that illegal aliens were employed at a
factory by looking largely to the racial or ethnic characteristics of the work force. In addi-
tion, testimony was obtained from three Latin American women arrested on their way to
work at Davis Pleating. However, none of the women identified any alien by name or gave
any support to their conclusion that illegal aliens were being employed at the factory. See
Amicus Brief, supra note 18, at 3.
2 - U.S. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 1760.
" Id. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 1742.
" Some agents describe the selective process as one involving the use of factors which
may indicate that a person is an alien. Such factors include: clothing; appearance; coloring;
demeanor; language; accent; and a variety of subjective factors. GEO. U.L. CENTER IMM. L.
REP. 49 (Fall 1983).
Experts in the area of Latin American immigration testified that they were unaware of
any differences between legal immigrants or naturalized citizens of Latin ancestry and un-
documented aliens with respect to skin color, eye color, hair color, height or other physical
characteristics since in southern California and most of the southwest large percentages of
the citizenry are, or appear to be, of Hispanic ancestry and many speak Spanish as their
native tongue. Neither appearance nor the presence of an "accent" is sufficient to justify a
belief that an individual is an illegal alien. Amicus Brief, supra note 18, at 5.
" Three of the respondents were employed at Davis Pleating. Delgado was asked where
he was from, and when he replied "Mayaquez, Puerto Rico," the agent left. Respondent
Correa was asked where she had been, and when she answered "Huntington Park," the
agent walked away. Respondent Labontes was tapped on the shoulder and asked in Spanish:
[Vol. 33:323
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free to move around within the factory.2 ' During the course of one of the
three factory "surveys," however, one respondent described an incident in
which an INS agent stationed at an exit attempted unsuccessfully to pre-
vent a worker from leaving." Justice Rehnquist described this encounter
as an isolated ambiguous incident which failed to show that the INS pro-
cedures constituted a "seizure.
26
In reviewing past "seizure" decisions of the Court, Justice Rehnquist
found that a detention under the fourth amendment has not occurred in
an encounter between the police and a citizen unless the circumstances of
the encounter are so "intimidating as to demonstrate that a reasonable
person would have believed that he was not free to leave if he had not
responded."27 It was this standard that Justice Rehnquist and the major-
ity used to evaluate the Delgado factory surveys.
After applying this standard, the Court concluded that the Delgado en-
counter was not so intimidating that a reasonable person would have be-
lieved that he was not free to leave; therefore, no seizure occurred. 28 Jus-
tice Rehnquist reasoned: "When people are at work their freedom to
move about has been meaningfully restricted, not by the actions of the
law enforcement officials, but by the workers' voluntary obligation to
their employers."'2 Since the workers were free to continue working and
to move about the factory, the manner in which the surveys were con-
ducted did not result in a reasonable fear by the workers that they were
not free to leave." The majority characterized the questioning of each
respondent as nothing more than a "brief encounter"'3' that did not
amount to a fourth amendment seizure.
Keeping in mind the factual scenario and holding of Delgado, an exam-
ination of the Court's previous efforts in this area is essential in order to
render an effective evaluation and ultimate judgment of the Delgado
"[wihere are your papers." She responded that she had them and showed them to the
agents without any further request. At Mr. Pleat, respondent Miramontes was questioned
about her citizenship enroute from an office to her worksite. When she replied that she was
a resident alien and produced her work permit at the agents request, the agent left. - U.S.
at -, 104 S. Ct. at 1764.
" Several agents carried handcuffs and used them to detain those apparently suspected
of being illegal aliens. The operation unfolded with surprise and resulted in sustained dis-
ruption of the working environment. Garment Workers v. Sureck, 681 F.2d 624 (9th Cir.
1982)(lower court ruling on Delgado). This disruption included the attempt by some work-
ers to hide. Id. at 627. Respondents Delgado and Labante both left the building during the
survey; neither stated in their depositions that they were prevented from leaving, restrained
in any way, or even questioned. Id.
25 _ U.S. at -. , 104 S. Ct. at 1764 n.6.
26 Id.




3 Id. at , 104 S. Ct. at 1764.
1984-85]
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decision.
IV. Terry v. Ohio AND ITS PROGENY
The concept of a seizure, including an encounter other than an arrest,
was first promulgated in Terry v. Ohio.2 Terry involved an encounter
between Officer McFadden, an experienced police detective, and two in-
dividuals including the defendant that the detective suspected were about
to commit a robbery. The detective approached the men, identified him-
self as a police officer, and asked for their names. When the men "mum-
bled something" in response, Officer McFadden grabbed Terry, spun him
around, and patted down the outside of his clothing. He felt a pistol and,
being unable to remove it, ordered the men into a nearby store where he
removed Terry's overcoat and patted down the other man, finding a gun.
The detective had no probable cause to arrest the individuals,3 3 however,
"[iun this case there can be no question that Officer McFadden seized
[the] petitioner. 3 4 Chief Justice Warren stated that "whenever a police
officer arrests an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he
has seized that person."35 The Chief Justice concluded, however, that this
type of police action is necessary as a result of the traditional diversity of
encounters between citizens and police, some of which may lead to dan-
gerous situations.30 To determine whether an officer's actions are reasona-
ble, the governmental interest which justifies the official intrusion must
be balanced against the constitutional rights of the individual.3 7
By characterizing the Terry police-citizen encounter as a seizure, the
Warren Court defined seizure as a restraint on an individual's freedom to
walk away from the police. Although this fundamental concept of Terry
remains intact, the Court has continued to refine it in cases such as
Brown v. Texas,38 United States v. Mendenhall" and Florida v. Royer.
4
1
In Brown, police in a patrol car spotted the appellant and another indi-
vidual in an alley. One officer got out and asked the appellant to identify
himself and explain what he was doing in the alley. The other man was
neither questioned nor detained. The officers did not suspect the appel-
a 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
"But we deal here with an entire rubric of police conduct - necessarily swift action
predicated upon the on-the-spot observations of the officer on the beat - which historically
has not been, and as a practical matter could not be, subjected to the warrant procedure."
Id. at 20.
" Id. at 19.
"' Id. at 16.
3I Id. at 30.
3' Id. at 21. Governmental interests include crime prevention and officer safety. See also
Camara v. Municipal Court, 380 U.S. 523, 534-35 (1967).
38 443 U.S. 47 (1979).
3- 443 U.S. 544 (1980).
,- - U.S. , 103 S. Ct. 1319 (1983).
[Vol. 33:323
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lant of any specific misconduct. Yet, when the appellant refused to iden-
tify himself, he was arrested under a Texas law" which makes it a crime
for a person to refuse to give his name and address to an officer "who has
lawfully stopped him and requested the information.""'
The Court held that when the officers detained the appellant for the
purpose of identification, he was seized for purposes of the fourth amend-
ment." Therefore, the Court concluded that mere detention for the pur-
pose of identification may, in fact, constitute a seizure; this holds true
even in the absence of specific questioning designed to further a criminal
investigation.
In Mendenhall, as the respondent arrived at the Detroit Metropolitan
Airport from Los Angeles, she was watched by two plain clothes agents of
the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). After observing the re-
spondent's conduct, which was characteristic of persons unlawfully carry-
ing narcotics,44 the agents approached her, identified themselves as fed-
eral agents, and asked to see her identification and airline ticket. The
respondent, Mendenhall, produced her driver's license which listed a dif-
ferent name from her airline ticket. When asked why the ticket bore a
different name, she replied that she just felt like using that name."5 In
4, TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 38.02(a) (Vernon 1974).
42 443 U.S. at 550.
41 Commentators have noted that in 1978 the Court began to vindicate fourth and fifth
amendment exclusionary rule claims with some regularity. Six such claims were upheld in
that year: Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979); Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753
(1979)(warrant required prior to search of luggage seized from lawfully stopped auto);
Torres v. Puerto Rico, 442 U.S. 465 (1979); Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319
(1979); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979) and New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450
(1979). See Seidman, Factual Guilt and the Burger Court: An Examination of Continuity
and Change in Criminal Procedure, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 436 (1980). The government's vic-
tory percentage in criminal cases declined from 79% in the 1975 term to 59% in the 1976
term. Id. at 448 n.68.
" Respondent fit the "drug courier profile," an abstract of characteristics typical of per-
sons carrying illicit drugs. Seidman, supra note 43, at 547 n.1. Evidently, DEA officers infer
a desire to avoid detection from a traveller being the last to disembark. Mendenhall, 446
U.S. at 547 n.1. A similar inference has been made if the passenger is the first to deplane.
See J. CHOPER, Y. KAMISAR & L. TRiBE, THE SUPREME COURT: TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS
1979-1980 137-39 (1981). In discussing Mendenhall, Choper contrasts DEA reliance on Men-
denhall's position as the last to disembark with another prosecutor's reliance on a defen-
dant's position as the first, remarking that "it would not surprise me if one of these days,
the government argues that a certain defendant met the profile because when the passen-
gers deplaned they were exactly in the middle of the line - to avoid attracting attention, of
course." Id. at 138 (cited in Johnson, Race and the Decision to Detain a Suspect, 93 YALE
L.J. 214, 219 n.27 (1983)).
For additional commentary on drug courier profiles, see Comment, Criminal Profiles Af-
ter United States v. Mendenhall: How Well Founded A Suspicion?, 1981 UTAH L. REV. 557;
Note, Drug Courier Profile Stops and the Fourth Amendment: Is the Supreme Court's
Case of Confusion In Its Terminal Stage?, 15 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 217 (1981); Note, Drug
Trafficking at Airports - The Judicial Response, 36 U. MIAMI L. REV. 91 (1981).
"1 446 U.S. at 548.
1984-851
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response to further questioning, the respondent indicated that she had
only been in Florida for two days. When one of the agents specifically
identified himself as a federal narcotics agent, Mendenhall, according to
the agents' testimony, "became quite shaken, extremely nervous. She had
a hard time speaking."4 After returning the airline ticket and driver's
license, the agent asked the respondent if she would accompany him to
the airport DEA office for further questioning. She did so and later con-
sented to a search, during which narcotics were discovered."
After reviewing its decisions in Terry and Sibron v. New York,48 in
which it approved of a search of the defendant because his "deliberately
furtive actions and fright at sight of law officer were proper factors" in
their decision to arrest,4 the Court held that Mendenhall had not been
seized by the two DEA agents.8 0 The Court reiterated the principle that
not every encounter between a police officer and a citizen is an intrusion
requiring objective justification and the protection of the fourth amend-
ment.51 The Court found that Mendenhall was free to walk away from the
questioning despite the fact that the police initiated the contact, that it
constituted more than a few questions, and that the detainee experienced
objective discomfort. "As long as the person to whom questions are put
remains free to disregard the questions and walk away, there has been no
intrusion upon that person's liberty or privacy as would under the Consti-
tution require some particularized and objective justification."'" The
Court also emphasized the Terry rationale that "characterizing every
street encounter between a citizen and the police as a seizure, while not
enhancing any interest served by the Fourth Amendment, would impose
wholly unrealistic restrictions upon a wide variety of legitimate law en-
forcement practices.""3
Despite and yet perhaps because of its holding in this difficult decision,
the Mendenhall Court felt motivated to identify the circumstances that
would transform a mere encounter into a protected seizure. These in-
clude: the threatening presence of several officers; the display of a
weapon by an officer; some manner of physical contact with the person by
an officer; and the use of language or tone of voice indicating that compli-
ance with the officer's request might be compelled.54
The Court concluded that the mere fact that an officer identified him-
6 d.
" Id. at 549.
48 392 U.S. 40 (1968).
Id. at 66-67.
60 446 U.S. at 555.
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self does not, by itself, convert an encounter into a seizure." Using the
criteria set forth in Mendenhall to gauge such an encounter, it is unclear,
although there was more than one officer, whether the DEA agents
presented a threatening presence; there were no weapons displayed and
the agents did not touch the defendant. It would appear from the facts
presented in Mendenhall that the agents used a tone of voice compelling
compliance by the detainee. However, to gauge such a nebulous and sub-
jective indicator as the tone of speech, or the precise language used, pro-
vides little meaningful guidance.
Despite the vagueness of the circumstances and standards set forth in
Mendenhall, this decision does not constitute the first real attempt by
the Court to give meaningful guidance to this area. The Mendenhall
Court adopted the fairly general holdings of Terry and Brown and began
the process of particularizing the kinds of actions that transform an un-
protected encounter into a fourth amendment seizure.
The Court further attempted to refine the parameters of a seizure in
Florida v. Royer." The decision of the Court was consistent with Brown
and Mendenhall in the respect that asking for and examining Royer's
driver's license, in and of itself, was not sufficient to turn the encounter
into a seizure. However, the situation in Royer escalated into a full-blown
seizure when the officers identified themselves as narcotics agents, told
Royer he was suspected of transporting narcotics, and asked him to ac-
company them to the police room while retaining his airline ticket and
driver's license. The police did not indicate to Royer that he was free to
leave.17 Justice White, writing for the majority, found that these circum-
stances amounted to a sufficient showing of official authority; a reasona-
ble person under the circumstances would have believed that he was not
free to leave. As a result, Royer had been seized for the purposes of the
fourth amendment.58
A comparison of Royer and Mendenhall highlights the nebulous and
subjective parameters by which a seizure is characterized. In both cases,
more than one agent confronted the respective subjects and asked for
identification. Subsequent to inconclusive questioning, both subjects were
"asked" to accompany the agents for further questioning; neither subject
was advised of his right to walk away. Despite the apparently consistent
fact patterns, the Court found that Royer was seized and Mendenhall was
not.
Only a year after Royer, the Delgado Court, working with these vague
and deficient standards was confronted with the complex and critical fact
11 Id. at 555. The person approached, however, need not answer any question put to him;
indeed, he may decline to listen to the questions and may go on his way. Florida v. Royer,
460 U.S. 491 (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 32-3 (Harlan, J., concurring)).
460 U.S. 491 (1983).
Id. at 502.
Id. at 501 (citing Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554).
1984-85]
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pattern of the factory surveys."
V. Delgado: CHANGING THE RULES
Despite Delgado's ultimate holding, an appreciation of the law of
Terry, Mendenhall and Royer should lead to the conclusion that the fac-
tory workers had been seized. The presence of uniformed officers with
weapons in the factory and armed agents stationed at the exits can cer-
tainly be characterized as threatening.6 Although the only indication of
any physical contact by an officer was an innocuous tap on the shoulder,"1
one of the respondents described an incident during which an agent phys-
ically blocked an exit and a worker pushed him aside.6 2 Moreover, while
there was no indication of any overt threats, it can be inferred that an
agent's persistent questioning would only terminate when satisfactory an-
swers were received. While these circumstances alone appear to distin-
guish Delgado from Terry, Mendenhall and Royer, other significant dif-
ferences were present in Delgado that reinforced the conclusion of
seizure.
The first distinction was the presence of "guards" at the exits. Justice
Rehnquist asserted that the purpose of this procedure was "to insure that
all persons in the factory were questioned, not to detain the workers in-
side."63 Despite this appraisal, the placement of agents at the exists adds
a strong indication of compulsory questioning, indeed, it appears that the
questioned workers were not free to leave. While it may be argued that
the detainees in both Mendenhall and Royer could choose to walk away,
it appears clear that the detainees in Delgado had no such choice.
Another distinction concerns the nature of the questions asked by the
INS officials. Justice Rehnquist discussed whether questioning an indi-
vidual about his identification would constitute a seizure:
Although we have yet to rule directly on whether mere question-
19 During the course of the first survey at Davis Pleating, 78 illegal aliens were arrested
out of a work force of approximately 300. The second survey nine months later resulted in
the arrest of 39 illegal aliens out of about 200 employees. The survey at Mr. Pleat resulted
in the arrest of 45 illegal aliens out of about 90 employees. - U.S. at __, 104 S. Ct. at 1766
n.3.
go Id. at __, 104 S. Ct. at 1759.
" Respondent Labontes was tapped on the shoulder and asked in Spanish, "Where are
your papers?" Labontes responded that she had her papers and without any further request
from the INS agents, showed the papers to the agents, who then left. Id. at -, 104 S. Ct. at
1764.
2 Id. at -' 104 S. Ct. at 1764 n.6.
01 Id. at -' 104 S. Ct. at 1763. The United States Civil Rights Commission found: "Tes-
timony received by the Commission indicates that INS area control operations do cause
confusion and pandemonium among all factory employees, thereby disrupting the factor's
operations an decreasing production." - U.S. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 1774 n.7. (quoting
UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE TARNISHED GOLDEN DOOR: CIVIL RIGHTS
ISSUES IN IMMIGRATION 90-91 (1980)).
[Vol. 33:323
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ing of an individual by a police official, without more, can amount
to a seizure under the Fourth Amendment, our recent decision in
Royer.. . plainly implies that interrogation relating to one's iden-
tity or a request for identification by the police does not, by itself,
constitute a Fourth Amendment seizure.14
Justice Rehnquist, however, failed to distinguish questions relating to
identity from inquiries relating to citizenship. Questions relating to iden-
tity, such as those involved in Mendenhall and Royer, are clearly prelimi-
nary to the primary purpose of the questioning officer or agents -
whether the detainee was involved with narcotic activity. By contrast, the
initial questions posed in Delgado involved questions concerned with citi-
zenship rather than questions related to identity. Nonetheless, Justice
Rehnquist made no distinction on this point. Questions relating to citi-
zenship in the factory "survey" situation go to the heart of the matter;
the agents were attempting to apprehend illegal aliens, and their exclu-
sive focus was citizenship or lack thereof. The questions posed in Delgado
did not constitute mere preliminary interrogation, but rather involved the
central concern and responsibility of the interrogating officers. Nonethe-
less, Justice Rehnquist made no distinction on this point.
A third and critical distinction is the failure of Justice Rehnquist to
consider the totality of the environment in which the INS inquiries were
made."8 Justice Rehnquist concentrated on the content of the questions
asked rather than on the coercive environment. He emphasized the fact
that the workers appeared to be free to walk around and continue work-
ing"0 and apparently disregarded the fact that armed agents were block-
ing the exits0 7 and that a worker was prevented from leaving by an INS
agent until he pushed the agent aside. 8 Justice Rehnquist labeled this
latter incident "ambiguous and isolated""0 despite the fact that, in Men-
denhall, a person prevented from leaving was found to have been seized.10
Despite these seemingly persuasive factors in support of a finding of
seizure, the Delgado Court found that a seizure had not occurred. In-
stead, the Court concluded that the circumstances of this factory survey
I U.S. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 1762.
15 The totality analysis must accommodate two competing concerns: the legitimate need
for such searches and the equally important requirement of assuring the absence of coer-
cion. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1972).
66 - U.S. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 1763.
67 In Petitioners brief, this issue was addressed. "Indeed, in Zepeda v. INS, 708 F.2d 355,
363 (9th Cir. 1983), petition for reh'g filed, the Court of Appeals specifically stated that its
holding in this case that an INS factory survey constitutes a seizure of the work force rested
on the fact that agents are stationed at the doors during the survey." Brief for Petitioner at
24 n.15, Delgado, - U.S. at -_, 104 S. Ct. at 1758.
66 Id. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 1764 n.6.
69 Id.
70 The seizure in Mendenhal was determined to be proper. 446 U.S. at 558.
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were not so intimidating that a reasonable person would have felt that he
was not free to walk away. Given the previously reviewed holdings, as well
as the circumstances determined to constitute a seizure as set forth in
Mendenhall, Delgado is a difficult case to reconcile with its predecessors.
VI. A DIsGUISED IMMIGRATION CASE?
Had the Delgado Court employed the rationale of Michigan v. Sum-
mers, which held that a search warrant carried with it a limited authority
to detain the occupants of the premises,71 or opted for the perspective of
Justice Powell in his concurrence that Delgado was actually an immigra-
tion case, 72 perhaps the holding would not fly in the fact of the sound
application of principle expressed in Delgado's predecessors. As suggested
by Justice Powell in his concurring opinion, Delgado could have decided
in the same manner as the immigration cases, United States v. Brignoni-
Ponce" and United States v. Martinez-Fuerte7 4
In United States u. Brignoni-Ponce, 7 the Court disallowed the border
71 452 U.S. 692 (1981). The facts of Summers are as follows:
As Detroit police officers were about to execute a warrant to search a house for
narcotics, they encountered respondent descending the front steps. They re-
quested his assistance in gaining entry and detained him while they search[ed] the
premises. After finding narcotics in the basement and ascertaining that respon-
dent owned the house, the police arrested him, searched his person, and found in
his coat pocket an envelope containing 8.5 grams of heroin.
Id. at 693.
The Court held that a warrant to search for contraband founded on probable cause im-
plicitly carries with it the limited authority to detain the occupants of the premises while a
proper search is conducted. Although the facts of Summers involved a resistance, while Del-
gado involved a factory workplace, the Court could have chosen to extend the Summers
rationale rather than evade the requirements of Terry. However, in Ybarra v. Illinois, 444
U.S. 85 (1979), the Court declined to extend Terry to allow the search of a person without
particularized suspicion. In Ybarra, a patron of a bar who was the subject of a search war-
rant, along with the bartender, was searched during the execution of the warrant without
reason to believe that he had committed or was committing any criminal offense. Moreover,
he had made no gestures indicating he was attempting to conceal contraband or said any-
thing which might have lead police to become suspicious. Id. at 91. The Court held that the
fourth amendment requires that officers have a particularized suspicion to make the search
of a person reasonable. Id. at 92.
In Delgado, the INS was acting pursuant to valid search warrants, and the employees
were certainly closely associated with the subject of the warrants. It might have been better
for the Court to leave the boundaries of what constitutes a seizure as established by Terry
and its progeny intact and to extend Summers to include a person's place of employment.
72 - U.S. at -_, 104 S. Ct. at 1765-67. (Powell, J., concurring). For an insightful com-
mentary addressing the employment of race as an element in establishing probable cause in
searches for illegal aliens, see Johnson, Race and the Decision to Detain a Suspect, 93 YALE
L.J. 214 (1983).
71 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
74 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
11 Id. In Brignoni-Ponce, two officers observing traffic from a patrol car parked at the
side of the highway near San Clemente, an area near the Mexican border, pursued respon-
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patrol's practice of stopping vehicles by a roving patrol in an area near
the border when the only grounds for suspicion were that the occupants
appeared to be of Mexican ancestry. 6 The Court balanced the public's
interest against the individual's right to personal security free from arbi-
trary interference by law officers. 7 7 The Court acknowledged the signifi-
cant public interest in having effective measures to prevent the illegal
entry of aliens at the Mexican border; 8 however, to protect the individ-
ual's rights and liberty, a "reasonable suspicion" must exist in order to
allow the minimal intrusion of a brief stop.
79
One year later, in Martinez-Fuerte, the Court found that the practice
of stopping automobiles for brief questioning at permanent traffic check-
points away from the Mexican border was consistent with the fourth
amendment, and under these circumstances, there is no need for a war-
rant.80 This case extended the ability of police to investigate and act in an
dent's car and stopped it, saying later that their only reason for doing so was that its three
occupants appeared to be of Mexican descent. The officers questioned the occupants about
their citizenship, learned that the passengers had entered the country illegally, and then
arrested all three. Id. at 874-75.
7e This extends the court's holding in Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266
(1973)(holding that officers need a warrant or probable cause to search vehicles by the use
of roving patrols at points removed form the border).
17 422 U.S. at 878.
78 The Court cites the estimate of one million illegal aliens made by the Commissioner of
the INS for the Immigration and Nationality Subcommittee of the House Judiciary Com-
mittee in 1972 and the significantly higher figure cited by the INS itself in its 1974 annual
report of ten to twelve million. Id. at 878 n.4. The number is now significantly higher. The
Court also acknowledges the difficulty in policing an international border almost 2,000 miles
long, when many aliens cross the border on foot miles away from patrolled areas. Id. at 879.
11 Id. at 881. The stop and inquiry must be "reasonably related in scope to the justifica-
tion for their initiation." Terry, 392 U.S. at 29. The officer must be aware of specific articul-
able facts that reasonably warrant suspicion that the vehicles contain aliens who may be
illegally in the country. Such factors may include proximity to the border, traffic patterns
on a particular road, and previous experience with alien traffic. 422 U.S. at 884-85. The
mere fact that the occupants of a car appear to be of Mexican ancestry is not sufficient. Id.
at 886.
'0 429 U.S. at 559. In Martinez-Fuerte, the validity of a permanent immigration check-
point on Interstate 5 near San Clemente, California was questioned. Interstate 5 is the prin-
ciple highway between San Diego and Los Angeles and the checkpoint is 66 miles north of
the Mexican border. The checkpoint was described as follows:
Approximately one mile south of the checkpoint is a large black on yellow sign
with flashing yellow lights over the highway stating "ALL VEHICLES, STOP
AHEAD, 1 MILE." Three quarters of a mile further north are two black on yellow
signs suspended over the highway with flashing lights stating "WATCH FOR
BRAKE LIGHTS." At the check-point, which is also the location of a State of
California weighing station, are two large signs with flashing red lights suspended
over the highway which state "STOP HERE - U.S. OFFICERS." Placed on the
highway are a number of orange traffic cones funneling traffic into two lanes
where a Border Patrol agent in full dress uniform, standing behind a white on red
STOP sign checks traffic. Blocking traffic in the unused lanes are official U.S.
Border Patrol vehicles with flashing red lights. In addition, there is a permanent
1984-85]
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immigration situation without removing any of the protections provided
by Terry.8
The Court again performed a balancing test between the interests of
the individual and those of public policy.82 The Court felt that the pre-
dictability of the checkpoints protects the expectation of privacy that an
individual has on the highway, and the fact that the field officers may
stop only those cars passing the checkpoint leaves less room for possible
harrassment by officers with unbridled authority." Justice Powell would
have preferred to resolve Delgado using the Martinez-Fuerte rationale
that permits a stop at a fixed checkpoint away from the border.8 4
Justice Powell's concurrence asserts that Delgado could have been de-
cided along the lines of Martinez-Fuerte. Justice Powell referred to the
government's interest in using factory surveys as a means of controlling
the illegal alien problem. 5 He explained that the government's interest is
building which houses th Border Patrol office and temporary detention facilities.
There are also floodlights for nighttime operation.
Id. at 545-46.
A "point" agent stands between the two lanes of traffic usually screening all northbound
vehicles which the checkpoint brings to a virtual halt. In a small number of cases, the agent
will determine that further inquiry is in order, and he will direct these vehicles to a second-
ary inspection area where their occupants all asked about their citizenship and immigration
status. The average length of this secondary inspection is three to five minutes. The govern-
ment admits that these secondary stops are not based on any articulable suspicion. Id. at
545-47.
8' The Court states that for many years it has been a national policy to limit immigra-
tion, as the number of aliens who wish to live and work in the United States is much larger
than the number that can be comfortably accommodated. The flow of illegal aliens from
Mexico, estimated to comprise approximately 85% of all illegal immigrants, poses formida-
ble law enforcement problems. The Court acknowledges the ease with which an individual
can enter the United States undetected. 428 U.S. at 551-52.
The Court cites the effectiveness of the fixed checkpoint in apprehending illegal aliens. At
the San Clemente checkpoint during an eight-day period in 1974, approximately 146,000
vehicles passed through the checkpoint, 820 of which were referred to the secondary inspec-
tion area where Border Patrol agents found 725 deportable aliens in 171 vehicles. Id. at 554.
Justices Brennan and Marshall lodged a poignant dissent in Martinez-Fuerte. The two-
pronged attack focused on the abandonment of the reasonable suspicion requirement and on
the discrimination it would permit. "That law in this country should tolerate use of one's
ancestry as probative of possible criminal conduct is repugnant under any circumstances."
Id. at 572 n.1. This is seemingly in support of an equal protection argument raised in re-
spondent's brief. Brief for Respondent at 43, United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 428 U.S. 543
(1976).
- 428 U.S. at 559.
83 - U.S. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 1766-67 and n.6.
, Justice Powell's concern is the fact that factory surveys account for one-half to three-
quarters of the illegal aliens arrested away from the border in Los Angeles and the govern-
ment's great interest in continuing the surveys. Justice Powell also points out that one of
the main reasons that the illegal aliens come is to seek employment and that factory surveys
strike directly at this cause.
81 Justice Powell cites an affidavit by the INS assistant director in Los Angeles who
reported that factory surveys account for one-half to three-quarters of the illegal aliens
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great due to dimensions of the illegal alien problem in this country and
the fact that one of the main reasons illegal aliens come to this country is
to seek employment.8" Factory surveys strike at this cause directly and
diminish the incentive for illegal aliens to cross the border.8 7 Justice Pow-
ell persuasively argued that the intrusion into the fourth amendment
rights of the employees is no greater than the intrusion in Martinez-
Fuerte.85
If the Delgado Court had opted for this immigration rationale, the in-
tegrity of Terry, Mendenhall and Royer would not have been dealt such a
great blow. Clearly given the different standards in immigration cases,
the Court could have reached the same conclusion without violating the
rules that it had created to define fourth amendment seizures.
VII. CONCLUSION
Delgado is a difficult case to categorize. Despite the insistence of Jus-
tice Rehnquist, Delgado does not merely apply existing "seizure" law to
the factory "survey" scenario. The Court specifically rejected an immigra-
tion approach, one which appears to represent the most viable means of
allowing these particular INS factory surveys. If Delgado, as Justice
Rehnquist implicity acknowledges, is a "seizure" case, it unequivocally
represents a significant broadening of the permissible scope of an unpro-
tected encounter to which the police may subject an individual. The
guidelines carefully wrought since Terry now have been so vastly ex-
panded that further reference to Terry, Mendenhall and Royer is only
paying lip-service to history. The new standard is Delgado with its broad
permissive police power. Delgado must be considered as further evidence
identified and arrested away from the border in Los Angeles. In that district alone, over




Id. Justice Powell, although acknowledging the surprise that the initial intrusion
would cause employees, seems to believe that the surprise would be mitigated by the fact
that the clear purpose of the raid (to apprehend illegal aliens) would be readily apparent to
lawful employees and that this would allay their concern and fright. Justice Powell also
notes that the expectation of privacy in one's workplace is similar to that in one's automo-
bile and is greatly lowered from the expectation in one's residence. Id. at -, 104 S. Ct. at
1767.
However, Justice Powell does not discuss the possible abuse of discretion inherent in fac-
tory surveys. In Martinez-Fuerte, this unfettered discretion was limited by the fact that
officers could stop only those cars which passed through the fixed checkpoint. 428 U.S. at
559. In order to eliminate the possible abuse of discretion and to prevent harrasment of a
particular group of factories or people by the INS, it would be necessary to review the pro-
cedure whereby factories were chosen to undergo surveys. What would be needed to protect
the interests of the individual is some routine administrative procedure which eliminated
the possibility of abuse - some method analogous to the fixed checkpoint in Martinez-
Fuerte.
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of the trend or movement by the Supreme Court to expand the ability of
police to react more effectively in "the often competitive enterprise of
ferreting out crime."89 The shocking aspect of this trend is that the fourth
amendment protections are being slowly chiseled away.
89 Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
[Vol. 33:323
16https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol33/iss2/6
